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Abstract: Based on three in-depth case studies, the study analyzes how and why 
Chinese enterprises partner with governments in cooperative ventures which aim 
to simultaneously achieve poverty alleviation objectives and establish profitable 
business ventures in rural areas. The analysis draws out specific characteristics 
of three government-business partnerships in China, which vary in terms of gov-
ernance structure, resource complementarity and incentives. The findings show 
that in this state capitalist system, outcomes of government-business partner-
ships depend on firms having unique resources and capabilities that serve par-
ticular policy objectives of the government. By the same token, in order to make 
partnerships attractive to firms, national and local governments must hold the 
keys to unique resources needed by enterprises looking to do business in low-
income markets. The cases further illustrate that, in order to build and maintain 
successful government-business partnerships over time, the alignment of incen-
tives plays an important role. In sum, complementary resources and well-aligned 
interests between firms and governments help to explain why some government-
enterprise partnerships are more successful than others.
*Corresponding author: Genia Kostka, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany, 
e-mail: geniakostka@gmail.com
Jianghua Zhou: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
1  Introduction
The concept of designing economically viable ventures to serve low-income 
groups living at the base of the economic pyramid (BoP) now has considerable 
prominence (Prahalad and Hart 2002; Nakata 2012). Through innovation of new 
products and services targeting the needs of the low-income group,  business ven-
tures can actively support poverty alleviation and at the same time can reach new 
untouched markets. Contributors to the BoP and Subsistence Markets (SMs) liter-
atures highlight the distinctive characteristics of low-income markets – e.g., their 
remote geographic location, customer bases with limited and irregular income 
streams, and challenging institutional environments – and delineate the types of 
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partnerships and business models likely to succeed in these markets (Webb et al. 
2010; Rivera-Santos, Rufin, and Kolk 2012). Existing studies particularly stress 
the importance of enterprises fostering joint ventures and voluntary partnerships 
with governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to overcome 
resource constraints in low-income markets (e.g., Hammond et al. 2007; London, 
Anupindi, and Sheth 2010).
Since the existing research has focused almost exclusively on low-income 
segments of market economies, there is still much to learn about how govern-
ment-business alliances and partnerships work in other contexts, especially 
state capitalist ones. Political economists increasingly see emerging economies 
such as China and Russia as state capitalist systems in which “the state exerts 
extensive control” (Huang 2011) and where the state uses markets and capital 
accumulation for political ends. Given this evident shift in the world, research 
on studying government-business partnerships in state capitalist contexts is 
very timely.
The focus here is on China since the low-income market in China has increased 
in importance for both firms and government. Over the past decades, the Chinese 
government has put tremendous effort in addressing poverty issues and rising 
income disparities. In 1986, the central government initiated the China Poverty 
Alleviation Program, which initially targeted 592 designated poverty counties and 
was subsequently revised to focus on over 148,000 villages.1 By the late 1990s, 
increasing awareness that non-coastal regions lagged behind the coastal region 
led to the government’s “Western Development Strategy” (1998) and the “Plan 
on Revitalizing Northeast” (2003). Under these programs billions of dollars were 
invested in the under-developed western and northeastern regions. As part of 
these initiatives, government spending related to broadening access to basic ser-
vices has increased dramatically. From 2005 to 2012, the central government’s 
spending related to people’s livelihood – agriculture, social security, education, 
health and affordable housing – has expanded from 507 billion RMB to about 
2.6 trillion RMB. However, current government programs face the daunting chal-
lenge of expanding in scope, coverage, quality, and efficiency to sufficiently serve 
the low-income groups. Fiscal and budget constraints are a substantial obstacle 
to making social services scalable, financially sustainable, and delivered in effec-
tive and efficient manner. In view of these constraints, the government hopes that 
government-business partnerships will help to broaden the provision of essential 
social services at an affordable price to excluded populations.
1 From 2001 to 2007, the central government spent on average 28 billion RMB annually for pov-
erty alleviation programs (World Bank 2009).
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Meanwhile, China has an enormous low-income market with huge potential 
purchasing power. Measured by income of US$1.25 per day (2005 PPP), there 
were 173 million people living below the poverty line in 2005 in China and if 
measured by the US$2 per day line (2005 PPP), the number increases to 395 
million. By either criterion, China is currently the second-largest low-income 
market in the world after India and represents more than 13% of the global 
low-income market.2 The large latent potential of China’s low-income market 
makes the country an obvious choice for this analysis. The low-income market 
in China is continuously growing as its members consume more. From 2005 to 
2010, per capita consumption expenditure of low-income rural households has 
increased from 1548 RMB to 2535 RMB. The large low-income market provides a 
new growth opportunity for the private sector to expand scale, reduce costs, and 
improve quality of products.
Based on three in-depth case studies, the study analyzes how and why 
Chinese enterprises partner with governments in cooperative ventures which aim 
to simultaneously achieve poverty alleviation objectives and establish profitable 
business ventures in rural areas.3 The analysis draws out specific characteris-
tics of three government-business partnerships in China, which vary in terms of 
resource dependence, alignment of incentives, identity of the partnership initia-
tor, and governance structure. For instance, large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
have more access to resources and capabilities as compared to small, private com-
panies and, as such, SOEs tend to form partnerships very different than private 
2 This does not include some disadvantaged groups that have a higher income but lack access to 
basic necessities of life, such as clean water and sanitation service, affordable housing, quality 
education, health care and modern financial services.
3 This research examines government-business partnerships in low-income markets. Low-
income markets differ from high-income markets as actors operating in them face significant 
resource constraints. The focus is on rural low-income markets since this is where the majority 
of Chinese people living below the poverty line reside. The country has a rural population of 
750 million people and, given that the income gap between rural and urban households is vast 
and growing, rural residents represent a large and powerful market. Of the rural population, 
approximately 40 to 100 million people live below the national poverty line. This range is based 
on different definitions of poverty ranging from an income of 3.3 RMB ($0.5) a day (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China 2009, available at  < http://www.stats.gov.cn > ) to the expenditure 
of 6.7 RMB ($1) a day [United Nations, Growing Inclusive Market Initiative, GIM Case Studies No. 
B071, B062, B079, B056, A020, A047 (New York: United Nations Development Programme 2008 
and 2010)]. Yet, the rural population also includes a small but growing middle class that is often 
excluded from the BoP target group. Rural citizens’ average per capita annual expenditure in 
2008 reached 5915 RMB ($917) and even the lowest 20% of the rural population had an average 
annual expenditure of 2145 RMB ($332) (Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2009).
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4 In the following, the term “government” refers to the administrative apparatus in charge of 
formulating and implementing public policies. “Local government” refers to the five adminis-
trative levels below the national level – provincial, municipal, county, town, and village level. 
The “state” here refers not only to government administrations, but also includes the Chinese 
Communist Party and other state-related organizations such as the Communist Youth League of 
China, the media or legal organizations. In some cases, the terms state and government are used 
interchangeably.
5 As this research specifically explores the role of domestic firms in low-income markets, the 
authors omitted multinational firms.
enterprises. The scale of investments and impact on low-income groups also 
influence the form and nature of government-business partnerships in rural low-
income markets.
The paper argues that in the Chinese state-capitalist context, outcomes 
of government-enterprise partnerships depend on enterprises having unique 
resources and capabilities that serve the particular policy objectives of the 
Chinese government.4 Simultaneously, governments must have unique 
resources that an enterprise needs in order to accomplish its goals. Align-
ment of incentives between governments and firms are key for establishing 
and maintaining successful long-term partnerships. The findings further show 
that since the Chinese government controls valuable resources in China’s 
state capitalist system, for an enterprise with an eye on opportunities in 
low-income markets, partnering with government agencies can be crucial to 
success in rural markets. These government-business partnerships are, as one 
might expect, at times more obligatory than voluntary for enterprises. Yet, our 
results suggest that such partnerships in which government actors more or less 
compel enterprises to participate are not necessarily losing ventures. On the 
basis of our empirical findings, we conclude that given the omnipotence of 
government in the Chinese economy, business models that adapt to the reali-
ties of state capitalism are much more likely to succeed than those guided by 
free market assumptions.
Given the lack of previous scholarly research on low-income markets in 
China, the study employs an exploratory qualitative research strategy (Eisen-
hardt 1989). Between January 2008 and July 2011, the authors first collected 
case study materials on efforts by Chinese enterprises to enter rural low-income 
markets in China, drawing on government documents and research reports as 
well as local newspapers.5 As a second step, three companies – China Mobile, 
Jiukang, and Zhilian – were selected for in-depth analysis to gain a better 
understanding of the dynamics and forms of partnership models used in state 
capitalist systems. A total of 35 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
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business managers, employees, farmers, and government officials in Beijing, 
Guangxi, and Jiangsu, the home of the three companies. The three companies 
are similar in that during the process of establishing a presence in rural low-
income markets they formed partnerships with central and local governments, 
but they differ in terms of the nature of these partnerships and the results of the 
partnership arrangements.
2  Literature review
2.1  Multi-sectoral partnerships in low-income markets
The BoP literature has recast rural low-income markets in developing or emerg-
ing economies as a largely untapped opportunity for viable business ventures 
( Prahalad and Hammond 2002; Prahalad and Hart 2002; Karnani 2007). According 
to estimates by the World Resource Institute, BoP markets represent a $5 trillion 
market opportunity per year (World Resource Institute 2007). The large poten-
tial of this market is explained by the fact that low-income groups living at the 
base of the income pyramid experience higher demographic and income growth 
than middle or high-income groups (UNCTAD 2006). Accordingly, as markets at 
the top of the income pyramid are becoming steadily more saturated, firms are 
increasingly seeking out new business opportunities in low-income market seg-
ments. Companies which position themselves early in these fast-growing markets 
have significant first-mover advantages as they can capture the most attractive 
market segments and secure the more reputable and trustworthy local partners 
and resources ahead of their competitors.
Yet, despite the size of low-income markets and the corresponding business 
opportunities therein, successful business ventures in these markets remain more 
the exception than the rule. This is partly a reflection of the fact that operating in 
low-income markets also carries substantial risks for large enterprises, especially 
since these markets are difficult to reach and resources are often  unavailable or 
non-tradable (Seelos and Mair 2007). Various contextual constraints complicate 
market entrance, including formal and informal institutional barriers (e.g., a 
problematic regulatory framework), unfamiliar customer groups (e.g.,  customers 
lacking financial resources or knowledge), cultural barriers and language obsta-
cles, and a challenging business environment (e.g., a lack of distribution chan-
nels, poor physical infrastructure) (Web et  al. 2010; Rivera-Santos, Rufin, and 
Kolk 2012). Furthermore, the impartial enforcements of laws and regulations and 
the protection of property rights is often spotty in low income markets meaning 
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that business transactions tend to be governed by relationships and networks 
rather than by formal contracts (De Soto 2000; London and Hart 2004).
In order to operate effectively in these markets with considerable business 
constraints, the BoP and SMs literatures stress the importance for enterprises 
to forge “multi-sectoral partnerships” (Das and Teng 2000).6 For enterprises, 
forming multi-sectoral partnerships with other enterprises, NGOs or govern-
ments tends to reduce enterprises’ initial investment costs and increases the 
long-term viability of projects (London and Hart 2004). Multi-sectoral partner-
ships can help enterprises to gain a better understanding of local consump-
tion habits, distribution channels, and infrastructure (Brugmann and Prahalad 
2007). Equally important, partnering with credible partners also provides access 
to valuable social networks and enhances enterprises’ reputation necessary 
to operate in rural low-income markets. NGOs or governments agencies often 
have a strong local presence in remote regions and over the years have worked 
closely with local communities, thereby gaining trust and credibility in these 
communities.7
While emphasizing the mutual benefits of multi-sectoral partnerships in 
low-income markets, the literature has, to date, explored these partnerships in 
economies seen to approximate free market conditions. In these studies, com-
panies are assumed to have free choice to select partners and enter markets so 
long as they abide by existing regulations and pay their taxes. In many coun-
tries around the world the assumption of a clear divide between the public and 
private sectors is a strong one but it is especially problematic in economies 
like China where the state retains tight control over many aspects of economic 
activity.
6 The term “multi-sectoral partnerships” refers to voluntary partnerships and joint ventures 
between enterprises and other for-profit organizations, non-profit organizations (e.g., NGOs, 
universities), or public actors (e.g., village committees governments) (Das and Teng 2000; 
Rivera-Santos, Rufin, and Kolk 2012). A number of factors are seen to shape the success or fail-
ure of these partnerships such as: having a clear division of responsibilities and contribution of 
resources appropriate to each partner’s advantages; a high degree of long-term commitment; 
a shared vision; flexibility, and; an awareness of the risks of working together (Brugmann and 
Prahalad 2007; Jacobson and Choi 2008).
7 For instance, British Petroleum (BP), a company with no experience in rural India, partnered 
with different NGOs when introducing new portable cook stoves into rural low-income markets 
in India. The partnership helped BP to enhance its reputation and tap into NGOs’ extensive in-
frastructure on the ground, while for the NGOs the arrangement helped to get access to business 
competencies needed for developing a stove that is not only cost-effective but also well inte-
grated in a global value chain (Brugmann and Prahalad 2007).
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2.2  Government-business partnerships in China
Previous research studying low-income markets focused primarily on partner-
ships between multi-national enterprises and NGOs.8 Yet, partnerships that thrive 
in these market economies might not be workable in all countries. In China, gov-
ernment, firms, and NGOs differ markedly from many other settings in terms of 
freedom to operate and the relative resources they control. These differences 
mean that the nature and type of multi-sectoral partnerships needed to enter and 
succeed in low-income markets take a different form in China.
2.2.1  Central and local governments
In China, the state exercises a high degree of control over the economy. The 
Chinese economic system differs from many other transitional countries in terms 
of the preservation of strong Party leadership combined with a decentralized 
economic structure. China’s authoritarian decentralized governance structure 
gives local governments more fiscal and administrative powers than in many 
other countries (Landry 2008). In rural areas, local governments control access 
to markets, finance, information, and other resources, all of which bear heavily 
on the success or failure of firms entering low-income markets. Local govern-
ment officials often act as gatekeepers by offering favored firms’ access to local-
ized knowledge and helping to win the trust of local residents. Indeed, in China, 
local governments frequently take on many of the roles played by NGOs in less 
statist developing countries. For example, government-run agricultural farmers 
associations in China do similar work to NGOs elsewhere in helping independ-
ent farmers improve farming techniques and gain access to agricultural inputs 
and market information. In rural areas, financing channels are also dominated by 
the state. The major players in the financial system are the so-called “Big Four” 
state-owned banks – the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, and China Construction Bank. 
State-linked rural credit cooperative foundations (RCCs) and rural commercial 
banks (RCBs) are likewise important providers of finance in non-urban areas.
China’s governmental structure has strongly shaped low-income markets in 
remote areas. Due to large government-driven infrastructure investments in the 
1990s and 2000s that link rural areas with larger cities, the physical distance 
of China’s low-income markets to existing (urban) markets has been reduced. 
8 See for example Brugmann, op. cit.
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Under the stability-conscious leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the central 
government has also devoted substantial resources to creating a “New Socialist 
Countryside,” a broad-ranging effort to strengthen the social safety net in rural 
areas. In both 2009 and 2010 the State Council’s “Document No. 1” emphasized 
the urgent need to develop poor rural areas and set up numerous support and 
subsidy programs to spur business development in these areas, such as the 
“sending computer and training to rural areas” and “sending appliances to rural 
areas” initiatives in 2009. In addition, China’s economic stimulus package rolled 
out during the global financial crisis (2008–2009) provided substantial funds for 
rural development, including more than 400 billion RMB ($60 billion) for low-
income housing and 370 billion RMB ($55 billion) for livelihood and infrastruc-
ture projects in rural areas (People’s Daily Online 2010).9 Under the new Poverty 
Reduction Program for Rural China (2011–2020), additional further investments 
are planned for building or improving village access roads, the drinking water 
supply, school buildings, rural sanitation, electrification and communication 
infrastructure, water storage, and irrigation systems. For a broad range of busi-
nesses in China, these projects will provide many new opportunities for firms to 
enter this market by partnering with governments.
2.2.2  Firms
With strong population growth and rapid rising incomes in rural areas in emerg-
ing economies, companies are thinking about business opportunities open 
to them in lower income segments. In many other countries, private or foreign 
enterprises are at the forefront of entering low-income markets, but this has tradi-
tionally not been the case in China since China’s private sector remains relatively 
small and lacks the preferential access to finance enjoyed by enterprises in the 
state sector (Huang 2008). Some nominally private firms like Huawei and Lenovo 
have started to enter low-income markets in China, but they can be considered 
as government-backed enterprises. State-owned enterprises and mixed-owner-
ship firms still play a dominant role in the economy, more than 30 years after the 
beginning of the “reform and opening” era (Sun 2003). Mixed or hybrid forms 
of ownership have greater significance in China because cross-ownership helps 
reduce uncertainty in inter-organizational relationships (Sun 2003).
9 People’s Daily Online (2010). China’s 4 trillion yuan stimulus package at farewell platform, 
available at  < http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7209270.html > .
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The conceptual distinction between the categories “private” and “state” is 
problematic also because the behavior of owners and managers in private and 
state-owned enterprises are not necessarily all that dissimilar. Previous work 
has found that local collective and state-owned enterprises faced a somewhat 
hardened budget constraint, from the mid-1990s forward and consequently 
became more cost-conscious and profit-oriented (Qian and Roland 1998). By 
the same token, private entrepreneurs might also place more importance on job 
security for employees more than profit maximization. The Communist Party’s 
efforts to co-opt the private sector since adoption of the “Three Represents” as 
official doctrine in 2002 have been largely successful and most non-state enter-
prises are tightly interlinked with local governments. Another characteristic of 
the Chinese market is that, in some sectors, regulatory restrictions still limit 
foreign firms’ market entry. For example, foreign banks and insurance compa-
nies face numerous restrictions in offering services in rural areas (Leung and 
Chyan 2006).
2.2.3  Government-business relationships
Scholars have observed different government-business models in China. At the 
national level, a number of scholars, and even the Chinese Communist Party 
itself, have claimed that China is developing into a “regulatory state.” In the 
ideal-typical regulatory state, regulatory bodies are both independent of busi-
nesses and have substantial autonomy from the political executive or legislature. 
According to Pearson (2005, 2007), the Chinese leadership holds a set of norma-
tive preferences for “orderly” competition and the creation of national champi-
ons. She argues that different regulatory schemes have been applied to strategic 
and non-strategic industries – what she calls “top tier,” “middle tier,” and “low 
tier” sectors (2006).
At the local level, previous field studies have described the central or local 
governments’ attitudes towards businesses as “developmental” (Shue 1988), 
“entrepreneurial” (Duckett 1998), “managerial” (Kostka and Hobbs 2013), “cli-
entelistic” (Wank 1995; Ong 2012), and “predatory” (Lü 2000; Pei 2006).10 While 
10 There are many alternative classifying labels, such as “state corporatist” (Oi 1992), “market-
facilitating” (Howell 1993), “paralyzed” (O’Brien 1994), and “booty socialist” (Lü 2000). The sum 
of evidence shows that many local governments subscribe to the developmental state approach, 
in which the state intervenes in the allocation of capital and labor flows through a strong bureau-
cracy and high levels of government ownership.
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these general categorizations are useful tools for portraying distinct local govern-
ment orientations, many government-business relations are in reality a hybrid of 
these categories and multiple relationship modes coexist in China. Even within 
one unit of local government there can be a high degree of intra-local diversity 
of attitudes and behaviors towards local businesses (Tsai 2002). The nature of 
government-business relationships can also change over time when one part-
ner’s bargaining power increases or declines. Ong (2012), for example, argues 
convincingly that local government’s “relative autonomy” and “state capacity” 
declined over the last decades and as a result, local states have been transformed 
from “developmental” states into “clientelistic” states. Acknowledging a general 
distinction in the degree to which government-business relations are clientelis-
tic or developmental towards businesses offers insights into larger patterns of 
government-business alliances. However, this classification does not provide 
much information on the characteristics and dynamics of specific government-
enterprise partnerships.
2.2.4  Non-governmental organizations
In many countries, NGOs make attractive partners for firms entering low-income 
markets because they mobilize resources directly or indirectly through their 
network ties. Yet, in China, independent NGOs play only a highly circumscribed 
role, since the government maintains a close watch over the activities of the third 
sector (Saich 2000). Of the NGOs in existence, a large number of them are also 
directly affiliated to governmental organizations and institutes and should be 
seen as so-called GONGOs (government organized NGOs). Through the closed 
networks they maintain with government officials and their policy expertise, 
these GONGOs articulate public interest and present these interests in state insti-
tutions and decision-making processes (Ho 2001; Kostka and Mol 2013). Of late, 
we also see more independent NGOs in China which play an increasingly impor-
tant role in the provision of community-based services by bringing in relevant 
knowledge, organizing petitions and using media outlets to disseminate their 
messages. Although the numbers of independent NGOs are on the rise, they are 
concentrated mainly in a few large cities in China, such as Beijing. Low income 
markets are more remotely located and isolated from big cities, and thus the role 
and influence of NGOs in China remains relatively small.
With the particularities of the Chinese context in mind, we turn now to a dis-
cussion of how enterprises’ market-entry strategies for low-income markets take 
these unique circumstances into account. Given the sheer size and power of the 
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Chinese government, business models that work in other markets might not apply 
here. For example, introducing small-scale mechanical water pumps, which were 
successfully introduced through enterprise-NGO partnerships in India, might 
only be a second-best solution to improve water accessibility in China. Previous 
research suggests that rather than relying on mechanical pumps or other small-
scale business models, a more effective and feasible solution to water accessi-
bility is to introduce large, government-led irrigation projects (Tong, Zhou, and 
Xing 2009). Instead of devising small-scale solutions, enterprises can align their 
business strategies with large-scale public works projects receiving support from 
central and local governments by, for instance, developing irrigation equipment 
for larger projects.
As we can see from the discussion above, in state-capitalist countries such 
as China, successful multi-sectoral partnerships between firms and the govern-
ment depend on the each side possessing resources complementary to those of 
the other. Both the governments and firms have scarce and valued resources 
needed for building a successful business model in low-income markets, yet 
none of them, on their own, could overcome structural barriers in these low-
income markets. As a result, both sides need to alter their structures and patterns 
of behavior to acquire and maintain needed external resources. Such resource 
dependence calls for the formation of links and partnerships among organiza-
tions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) in order to address to the uncertainty in resource 
acquisition.
The following proposition guides the ensuing analysis: in China, an economy 
bound by a strong state, partnerships with central and local governments are an 
effective strategy for enterprises to acquire the resources needed to enter low-
income markets. For establishing and maintaining successful long-term part-
nerships, alignment of incentives between governments and firms is of crucial 
importance. We consider a partnership as successful if the partnering tactics 
lead to the achievement of common goals and create valued and measurable 
benefits. Benefits can, for instance, include increased product success rates, the 
development of distinctive competencies arising from partnerships with local 
communities or government agencies, reduced incidence of unfavorable litiga-
tion, reduced levels of negative publicity, and favorable regulatory policies. Local 
governments are particularly important partners for firms since governments act 
as gatekeepers for valuable resources, such as finance, infrastructure, assistance 
with planning, advocacy, and establishing links to local partners and stakehold-
ers. Firms that successfully partner with governments can, thus, reduce their 
market entry risk and readily scale up their business in low-income markets. On 
the other hand, those firms that fail to build working relationships with central or 
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local governments tend to have a more difficult time in establishing a long-term 
presence in rural low-income markets.
3  Case studies
Given that this study’s objective is to assess whether or not resource dependence 
and aligned incentives matter for the success of government-enterprise partner-
ships in China’s low-income market, the authors adopted an exploratory research 
strategy. This is a suitable strategy given the relatively unexplored nature of this 
research topic (Yin 1984). The study focuses on three companies that partnered 
with central and local governments to target low-income markets in rural areas. 
The three cases were selected based on three criteria. First, the selected cases 
had initiated business in the low-income market in China. Second, selected 
cases were business-led and relied on a partnership with a government organi-
zation for conducting their business. Third, both successful and unsuccessful 
cases should be selected in order to analyze whether variation in resources and 
alignment in incentives leads to different outcomes of government-enterprise 
partnerships.
We selected three case studies that satisfied these criteria. Two government-
business partnerships with successful market-entry are contrasted with one 
unsuccessful partnership. The difference between these cases reflects the wide 
variety of government-enterprises partnerships in state-led economies. The 
first case is of a strategic partnership between a state-owned enterprise, China 
Mobile, and the central government to provide telecommunication services in 
rural areas. The authors examine China Mobile’s experience in setting up an 
Information Network Platform for Rural Areas (INPRA), which both served the 
government’s goal of extending telecommunications services to underprivi-
leged areas and China Mobile’s objective to expand its mobile phone customer 
base in rural areas. The second case study looks at a privately-owned company, 
Nanjing Jiukang Biological Technology Company, which developed a bio-pes-
ticides business in rural areas and established a joint-venture company with 
the Nanjing municipal government in Jiangsu. The third case study analyzes 
Zhilian Renewable Energy Company, a private company that initially partnered 
with the Nanning municipal government in Guangxi to produce bio-diesel 
from Tung trees. We find that the last company’s efforts were unsuccessful in 
expanding into low-income markets largely because the slow pace of the pro-
ject’s investment returns were out of step with the short-term priorities of the 
local government.
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3.1   China Mobile: building an information network platform  
for rural areas
3.1.1  A successful government-business partnership
The Information Network Platform for Rural Areas (INPRA) is a striking example 
of a successful partnership between a state-owned company and the central 
government. The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA) first initiated the platform in 2004. With INPRA, the govern-
ment hoped to redress the information asymmetry problem in rural markets and 
improve farmers’ access to information technology. To do so, the ministries part-
nered with the state-owned enterprise11 China Mobile, which the government 
perceived to have the best technological, financial, and managerial capabilities 
of China’s three telecommunications service providers. In contrast to the other 
partnerships considered in this paper, in this case, it was the central government 
who selected the partnering firm and not vice versa.
For the two ministries, the INPRA roll-out in 2004 was part of a larger gov-
ernment initiative fostering rural development to create a “harmonious society,” 
a hallmark of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership starting in 2003. The INPRA 
system provides farmers with up-to-the-minute information on agricultural 
prices, which greatly enhances their ability to negotiate with distributors. Users 
of the INPRA can also use cell phones to sell directly to their distributors or the 
final customers. In addition, the INPRA provides farmers with up-to-date infor-
mation on weather and technical support. Prior to the arrival of INPRA, distrib-
utors provided farmers with no or only limited information on prices and the 
level of buyers’ demand. Consequently, farmers often had to base their planting 
schedule on the previous year’s information which engendered chronic supply 
problems (Figure 1).
11 In the parlance of Chinese statistics, China Mobile is officially counted as a “state-controlled 
enterprise” (guoyou konggu qiye) and not as a “state-owned enterprise” (guoyou qiye) since it 
is a shareholding company in which the state retains a majority of shares (∼70%) but does not 
wholly own it. In reality, “state-owned” is not a misnomer since the government and Party main-
tain a high degree of influence over China Mobile and China’s other state-controlled national 
champions, through a number of mechanisms. First, in all such large enterprises, Party Com-
mittees sit in parallel to the Board of Directors and retain authority over all decisions of primary 
importance. Second, the CEOs of these enterprises are also typically included on the Party’s 
nomenklatura list, many of them at ministerial or vice-ministerial rank. Third, China Mobile is 
overseen by a powerful central government bureaucracy, the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission, which conducts annual performance reviews according to gov-
ernment priorities.
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As a business venture, INPRA well exceeded China Mobile’s and the govern-
ment’s expectations. In the first 5 years of its existence, from 2003 to 2009, the 
INPRA service grew at an annual rate of 30%. By the end of 2010, INPRA extended 
over 97% of rural areas and its users exceeded 57 million (China Mobile Limited 
2011b). China Mobile under the INPRA program sent out an average of 19.5 million 
SMS a day by the end of 2010 (China Mobile Limited 2011b). A manager in a China 
Mobile branch office summarizes the success of INPRA:
At first, we started this business as a social responsibility service, but we learned that it not only 
provides social benefits, but also considerable economic returns. The rural market business 
unit accounts for most part of our recent business growth. (Interview, Beijing, August 2009).
According to a China Mobile employee, by 2007, just 3 years after the introduc-
tion of INPRA, China Mobile’s business in rural markets had become profitable, 
despite the large initial investment of 19.5 billion RMB and the below-average user 
fees. (Interview, Beijing, August 2009).
While the reliability of the profitability data is somewhat questionable, 
the INPRA project certainly helped China Mobile position itself as the core 
player in China’s rural telecommunications markets. As of 2011, China Mobile 
is the largest mobile telecommunications provider in China and commands 
a market share nationally of 70%. Between 2006 and 2008, China Mobile’s 
rural customer base expanded enormously as approximately half of all new 
subscribers were located in rural areas (105 million customers over 3 years).12 
According to their 2010 Annual Report “rural and migrant markets continued 
Rural area Urban outskirts Urban areas
Producer
Local
distribution
market
Supermarket
Agricultural 
market 
Local buyers
Urban 
distribution 
market
Consum
ers
Figure 1 Market structure for agricultural outputs in China prior 2004.
Source: Adopted from Chen (2004).
12 By 2011, China Mobile is the only service provider in China that seriously targeted rural 
areas, while in urban markets China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile are fiercely 
competing in the increasingly mature urban market. See Bloomberg Businessweek, “Chinese 
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to be key growth drivers,” accounting for the majority of new customers, whilst 
the mid- to high-end customer base were described as only “stable” (China 
Mobile Limited 2011b: p. 22). Within China Mobile, the INPRA system was seen 
an important first step in learning about farmers’ consumption patterns and 
allowed the company to collected valuable “learning experiences” over the 
year (Interview, Beijing, August 2009). In view of its success in the country-
side, in 2009, China Mobile signed a strategic framework agreement with the 
Ministry of Agriculture to continue its engagement and to invest 70 billion RMB 
during 2009–2012 to cover an additional 10,000 villages and increase rural 
network coverage from 97% to 98% by the end of the 3  years (China Mobile 
Limited 2011a).
China Mobile’s great success in China’s rural market served as encour-
agement to offer additional services and expand its rural market activities. In 
2008, China Mobile expanded INPRA by including a Rural Job Network which 
provides farmers with information on new job openings. By year-end 2010, the 
Rural Job Network hotline received an average of 31,000 calls per month (China 
Mobile Limited 2011b). China Mobile also initiated a call line for INPRA, labeled 
www.12582.com, which links farmers directly to relevant experts. By 2010, the 
website ranked first among agricultural websites in China by number of hits 
and the hotline service received 26,000 calls per day (China Mobile Limited 
2011b). Most recently, in 2010, China Mobile drew on its vast knowledge of 
customers’ consumption patterns in rural markets gained through INPRA in 
rolling out local calling and group packages tailored to the specific needs of 
rural users.
China Mobile also constantly diversified and improved its rural information 
services at the local level. In 2011, Shandong China Mobile operated a three-tier 
information service system that delivers tailored news at the village, township, 
and county level. Many provinces also developed a number of sub-services for 
INPRA. The China Mobile subsidiary in Jiangsu province extended the platform 
by, for instance, integrating INPRA with a new, cooperative medical service 
by offering farmers medical services when they bought a cell phone. In Fujian 
province, INPRA included a new service that allowed farmers to apply for loans 
directly from their handsets.
China Mobile’s success in service provision in rural areas was also the 
main driver behind the company’s decision to make its first foray into overseas 
markets. In 2007, China Mobile purchased Pakistani cell phone company Paktel 
Telecom: China Mobile Leads the Way: Half of China Mobile’s new customers will come from the 
countryside,” 2009, available at  < http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2009/
gb2009085_090539.htm > .
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for $560 million and launched the Zong cell phone brand in rural Pakistan. At 
the time, the high proportion of Pakistan’s residents living in rural areas (approx. 
66%) was seen as a major investment draw and China Mobile’s Chairman Wang 
Jianzhou hoped to replicate the company’s success in the Chinese countryside 
(Telecom Asia 2007). As yet, though, Zong has struggled to take market share 
from Pakistan’s four established larger telcos, in part because the rural strategy 
successfully employed in China has proven a difficult transplant to Pakistan 
where rural land prices are higher, a factor which has frustrated the provision of 
telecom bases and equipment (Caixin CNBC 2011).
3.1.2  Addressing resource constraints
Prior to the partnership formed between the Ministry of Information Industry 
(MII), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and China Mobile in 2004, China’s tele-
phone service providers balked at the considerable resource and market con-
straints in rural markets. The large state-owned telephone service providers’ 
cell-phone investments in rural areas lagged well behind those in urban areas, 
as managers saw farmers’ income as too low to sustain a profitable cell phone 
business (Interview, Beijing, August 2009). The main resource and market con-
straints in implementing the INPRA in rural areas were: (1) existing gaps in local 
cell phone network coverage, (2) the lack of tailored and up-to-date agricultural 
information services, and (3) the farmers’ lack of information about the benefits 
of a mobile information service. The establishment of a strong multi-sectoral 
partnership linking various ministries to China Mobile was key in overcoming 
these constraints.
The first constraint – low cell phone coverage – existed because the telephone 
service providers lacked sufficient incentives to invest in poor rural areas. The MII 
and MoA asked China Mobile to invest 19 billion RMB (approx. $2 billion) to build 
a cell phone network in rural areas. Given their considerable misgivings about 
rural markets, China Mobile’s management may have only grudgingly acquiesced 
to this request though interviews with China Mobile’s middle-level management 
did not provide sufficient evidence to conclude whether or not China Mobile had 
voluntarily entered this partnership.
Another major constraint was that prior to selecting an appropriate informa-
tion platform, a data gathering process was needed to ensure that the service 
could in fact provide farmers with tailored and up-to-date information. The MII 
persuaded China’s largest state-owned media group Xinhua, in cooperation with 
the Agriculture Science Academy and China Agriculture University to collect the 
data for China Mobile. China Mobile, in turn, integrated the INPRA service with 
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the local agricultural administration departments’ (LAAD) message processing 
system in order to offer farmers regional-specific and bundled information on 
pesticides, fertilizer selection, seed varieties, and planting technology, all deliv-
ered via text messages.
A third challenge was to reduce farmers’ skepticism about information tech-
nology and stimulate demand for the INPRA service. Initially, many farmers 
were reluctant to use the information platform and preferred to rely on word-
of-mouth information or the village’s official broadcasting channel. To gain the 
trust of the farmers, the MII and MoA asked different local governments to start 
pilot schemes. Local government officials introduced China Mobile managers to 
selected village governments, who made their village broadcast and other chan-
nels available to advertise the INPRA. A China Mobile employee explains how this 
government introduction fostered acceptance among farmers:
Farmers thought that cell phones were an unnecessary investment, and INPRA was just a trick 
to obtain money. The local governments contacted the village leaders for us, who closely fol-
lowed instructions from the upper-level government. This was a very effective snowball effect; 
for example, one local government organized seven villages to test INPRA before it was rolled 
out. (Interview in Beijing, August 2009).
Managers also initially offered the INPRA service at a subsidized price to make the 
service acceptable to and affordable for farmers. While the average urban China 
Mobile user has to pay between 10 and 60 RMB per month for a mobile service, 
INPRA users were charged just two RMB per month (approx. $0.25). Additionally, 
when farmers called the inquiry center, the fee was 0.1 RMB per minute, lower 
than the average market price of 0.2–0.4 RMB per minute. (Interview in Beijing, 
August 2009).
3.1.3  Factors contributing to success
The capacity of China Mobile to operate a large mobile network in remote areas 
made it the best available partner for the central government (MII and MoA) to 
achieve national poverty reduction goals, while the resources the national minis-
tries MII and MoA could leverage were complementary to China Mobile’s resource 
set. This government-enterprise partnership is a quintessential example of a 
win-win situation as MII and MoA achieved their social policy objectives to increase 
farmers’ income while China Mobile was able to access the resources and partners 
it needed to operate successfully in rural areas. While the partnership in its initial 
stages may have been more compulsory than voluntary, in the final analysis China 
Mobile gained from the competence and resources advantages provided by its 
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partners in government. As noted, MII secured assistance from the media group 
and research institutes in the data-gathering phase and MoA linked the project 
with the relevant local agricultural departments. At the same time, China Mobile 
tapped its managerial and technical expertise in the telecommunications industry 
to develop the technology to support the platform. The actors maintained separate 
organizational forms, but worked closely and effectively in project teams.
China Mobile benefited from partnering with the two ministries by gaining 
access to their resources, technical and planning expertise, advocacy, and links 
to media partners, R&D institutes, agricultural universities, and local branches 
of the MoA (Figure 2). The two ministries’ initiation and coordination of the stra-
tegic partnership helped to overcome coordination problems that could have 
arisen had there been no clear governance structures. Local governments also 
supported China Mobile by sending agricultural experts to rural areas to train the 
farmers in using INPRA. The local governments employed their vertical adminis-
trative structures to encourage farmers to use the platform, thereby helping China 
Mobile win acceptance from potential platform customers. Specifically, village 
governments mitigated the lack of pre-existing distribution channels by employ-
ing their own channels to promote the platform.
3.2  Jiukang company
3.2.1  A successful government-business partnership
Nanjing Jiukang Biological Science Technology Development Company Ltd. 
(hereafter referred to as Jiukang) is a company in Nanjing, Jiangsu province which 
Farmers
Inquiry
Information
delivery 
SMS, internet, phone 
LAAD 
Agricultural universities 
R&D institutes 
Media partner 
Expert consulting service
Technical support service
Information on: 
- Weather  
- Market  
- Policy  
- Technology 
- … 
Information collection 
Phone
Figure 2 China Mobile information network platform for rural areas, 2005.
Source: Adopted from Luo (2007).
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produces Neem-tree-based bio-pesticides. A professor from the Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences and an investment banker jointly established Jiukang in 
2002 after successfully synthesizing a new Neem-based bio-pesticide. Two years 
after their research breakthrough, the two entrepreneurs set up a joint-venture 
with the Nanjing municipal government. This resulted in the formation of a 
shareholding company called Nanjing Jiukang Biological Technology Company 
Ltd., with the two private entrepreneurs holding 30% and the Nanjing govern-
ment 70% of the company’s shares.
After testing and comparing different Neem-oil-extracting technologies, 
Jiukang rented 5000 μ (1 μ = 1/15 of a hectare) of non-arable, hilly land from 
farmers to start production. Jiukang sells its Neem bio-pesticides for 15 RMB per 
bottle, almost the same price as most chemical pesticides. Jiukang also manufac-
tures bio-diesel from the leftover parts of the Neem fruits and organic fertilizer 
from the residuals. These spin-off businesses provide the village with valuable 
new sources of tax revenue. For instance, in 2008, the families in Qiaoli village, 
one of Jiukang’s Neem-tree-planting sites, received an income of 0.8 million RMB 
from Jiukang, which was more than a third of Qiaoli Village’s GDP (the total GDP 
was 2 million RMB). A farmer summarizes the benefits as: “Previously, the hills 
were almost useless. Now I can grow Neem trees and I get paid 1500 RMB per year. 
It is good.” (Interview in Nanjing, March, 2009).
3.2.2  Addressing resource constraints
Initially, as a private enterprise operating in a low-income market, Jiukang faced 
various resource and market constraints, principally: (1) insufficient finances to 
conduct R&D; (2) poor transportation networks and supply chain interruptions 
through irregular raw material deliveries; and (3) farmers’ skepticism towards 
Neem-based bio-pesticide. The joint-venture with the Nanjing municipal govern-
ment effectively addressed these constraints and helped the company quickly 
scale up its business.
The first constraint was a lack of financial resources which could be used 
to develop new seed varieties suited to local soil conditions and a non-tropical 
climate zone. As a start-up, Jiukang was unable to obtain sufficient loans from the 
local state-owned banks to finance the required tests and equipment. The entre-
preneurs solved this problem when the partners set up the joint venture and the 
government-owned Nanjing Hi-Tech Venture Capital Fund invested seven million 
RMB ($1 million). These funds allowed Jiukang to use a new grafting and tissue 
culture technology to cultivate new species of Neem tree which were uniquely 
suited to local conditions.
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The second challenge the enterprise faced was overcoming the challenges 
posed by poor transportation infrastructure and supply chain interruptions. 
Given the intense competition between firms for land to be used for agricultural 
and industrial usage, Jiukang found it difficult to establish Neem tree planta-
tions on a large scale. Accordingly, the Nanjing government linked Jiukang 
with village governments, which used word-of-mouth communication, street 
slogans, and public village meetings to persuade farmers to switch from the 
existing maize or root vegetable crops to Neem trees. The Nanjing municipal 
government also linked Jiukang with government agencies and agricultural 
associations in other provinces to scale up its business. This government-to-
government negotiation led to Jiukang signing four contracts for large tree-
planting areas with agricultural cooperatives in Shandong, thus ensuring a 
stable raw material supply. In return, Jiukang agreed to purchase the harvest 
at a minimum price and provide free seeds and technical support. The Nanjing 
Government also introduced Jiukang to foreign investors and Jiukang eventu-
ally won a 100,000 μ planting contract in Malaysia. In August 2009, the local 
government also started to link Jiukang with decision-makers in Africa, further 
encouraging Jiukang to expand its business. Improving the local transporta-
tion infrastructure proved more difficult, but the village governments and the 
municipal government combined their financial sources and shared the costs 
of building new roads.
The third obstacle was promotion of the usage of bio-pesticide. Chinese 
farmers are accustomed to chemical pesticides’ immediate pest-killing proper-
ties and were reluctant to wait for 2 days for the bio-pesticides’ effect to show. 
The companies’ investment in advanced synthesis technology yielded new bio-
pesticides which could kill pests within 2 h, thus addressing the local farmers’ 
needs.
3.2.3  Factors contributing to success
As in the China Mobile case, Jiukang and the local government possessed com-
plementary resources that helped to account for the success of this multi-sector 
partnership. For its part, Jiukang employed its newly developed technology 
to create a sustainable and profitable business while the local governments 
hoped to increase the farmers’ income and promote the bio-agricultural sector, 
while also obtaining financial returns from the investment. And since Jiukang 
recruited and trained village women and old men as part-time tree planting 
workers, reducing unemployment helped Jiukang to align incentives and 
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cement its good relationship with the village leadership. The company’s excel-
lent guanxi ties with local governments also boosted Jiukang’s reputation at the 
local level in a manner similar to the China Mobile case. As well, the produc-
tion of affordable bio-pesticides alleviated pressing environmental problems 
in Jiangsu by decreasing poisonous pesticide residuals, soil degradation, and 
water pollution.
The two actors offered each other valuable resources and capabilities. 
Jiukang had the technology and creativity to develop a new business model that 
incorporated farmers as producers and consumers, while the government pro-
vided access to finance, infrastructure, technical and planning advice, advocacy, 
and links to other strategic partners. The Nanjing municipal government linked 
Jiukang to other stakeholders, including village committees and agricultural 
associations, to transfer the model to other provinces. The company also signed 
contracts with agricultural associations which left coordination of the farmers 
and tree planting in the hands of the capable and socially influential association 
management. Finally, Jiukang’s partnership with village committees effectively 
leveraged the local village committees’ social network and influence to recruit 
workers and distribute information.
The BoP literature emphasizes the difficulty of scaling up business initiatives 
in low-income markets (London, Anupindi, and Sheth 2010), but this case illus-
trates how government involvement improved the company’s access to suppli-
ers and investors. The Nanjing government helped Jiukang partner with different 
provinces’ agricultural associations and also introduced the company to foreign 
investors, allowing it to expand its supplier networks beyond China.
The particular corporate form of this partnership also contributed to its 
success. Jiukang and the Nanjing government adopted a shareholder partner-
ship model with the founders holding 30% and the Nanjing government 70% 
of the company’s shares. Although the local government holds the majority 
of shares, it did not actively interfere with the enterprise’s operation. Accord-
ing to company managers, a clear separation between ownership and man-
agement ensured that the municipal government had financial incentives to 
offer Jiukang strategic resources, while leaving the daily management to the 
entrepreneurs. However, it is also possible that the entrepreneurs of the firm 
provided substantial stock options to individual government officials who 
helped the firm in entering new markets (both locally, and foreign markets 
in Malaysia and possibly, in Africa). Such shady dealings cannot be ruled out 
as similar instances of corrupt practices are widely reported in China (see for 
example the milk power cases or brick scandals widely reported in recent years 
in China) (Po 2009).
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3.3  Zhilian renewable energy
3.3.1  An unsuccessful government-business partnership
Zhilian Renewable Energy (Zhilian) is a private-owned company manufacturing 
bio-diesel with Tung trees in Nanning municipality in Guangxi province. Tung 
trees grow in Southern China, and the seeds of the tree can be used to produce bio-
diesel. During interviews in 2010, the managers of Zhilian disclosed their plans 
to cover the whole value chain, including tree planting base, bio-diesel produc-
tion and marketing. The company initially discussed its plan with the Nanning 
municipal government, which pledged government support for the business. Yet 
despite its promising start and the company and the local government possessing 
complementary resources, the company’s efforts to enter this business in low-
income markets failed due to misaligned incentives and interests, and by 2011, 
the company no longer existed in Nanning.
3.3.2  Addressing resource constraints
With a large initial R&D investment, the company mastered the technology of 
producing bio-diesel from Tung trees. The main constraints the company faced 
in 2010 were: (1) no production capacity, (2) no stable material supply (Tung tree 
seeds), and (3) a lack of incentives for local farmers to participate.
Zhilian used its own financial resources and reached out to the government 
to address difficulties in the low-income market, but efforts to overcome these 
constraints were ultimately unsuccessful. In an effort to address the first con-
straint, Zhilian persuaded a number of local firms to produce bio-diesel using 
the company’s technology. As to the second constraint, Zhilian considered 
four different business models. The company weighed: first, investing directly 
in a planting base of its own; second, co-investing on a planting base with a 
partner; third, cooperating with landowners such that the latter could become 
shareholders; and fourth, forming contractual relationships with farmers 
where farmers contributed land and labor and the company agreed to purchase 
the tree seeds. In the end, the first and the second model were found to exceed 
Zhilian’s investment capacity and the company finally selected the third and 
the fourth model. To address the third constraint, the company hired private 
agents to negotiate and collaborate with farmers. This approach differed mark-
edly from Jiukang’s where business owners had directly entered a joint venture 
with the municipal government. Zhilian elected not to involve local govern-
ments as a close partner.
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3.3.3  Factors contributing to failure
While initially the government had promised support to Zhilian, these promises 
never materialized when Zhilian began to struggle with the magnitude of the 
resource constraints. Since the Tung tree could not provide economic returns within 
a 3-year time frame — the trees require a minimum growing time of 3 years — the 
local government had little incentive to get invested in the value chain. The local 
government’s short time horizons are partly a result of the fact that local govern-
ment officials are evaluated through the cadre evaluation system and must deliver 
concrete economic and social targets annually (Edin 2003). Since raising farmers’ 
income is a mandatory, “hard” ( ying xing) target, failure to provide quick success 
could very well result in government officials’ losing their annual bonus payments 
or even missing out on the next round of promotions [in China, cadres are rotated 
or promoted every 3–4 years, see Eaton and Kostka (2014)]. In addition, counting 
on returns only 5 years down the line is highly risky in an environment character-
ized by opportunistic behavior stemming primarily from the under-development 
of legal institutions in China. Low-income markets – characterized by the absence 
of advanced formal institutions – are governed through relational governance 
(Macneil 1980; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987) mediated through networks and trust 
rather than contracts. Thus, when evaluating possible priority projects, risk-averse 
government officials tend to look more favorably on agricultural investments with 
quick and measurable returns in their own tenure time.
The misalignment of the government’s incentives (i.e., fast economic return 
within 3 years) with the firm’s incentives (i.e., economic return within 3–5 years) 
served to dampen the government’s initial enthusiastic support for the firm. 
Indeed, our fieldwork revealed that local government support tilts strongly 
toward fast-growing economic plants. One interviewee told us:
The government prefers projects that can yield revenue sooner. For example, those who plant 
sugarcane can get subsidies from government. As a result, the farmers are incentivized not 
to plant tung trees. Even in the non-fertile lands, the farmers are encouraged to plant fast-
growing plants, such as camellia. (Interview in Nanning, October 2010).
Without the support of local government, Zhilian was unable to gain the farmers’ 
trust. And due to the geographic dispersal of the farmers, scaling up the business 
proved onerous and time-consuming. Additionally, the government decreed that 
Tung trees could not be planted in fertile lands. The combination of these factors 
ensured that the business did not develop as Zhilian had planned. By year-end 
2010, just one fifth of the expected 1 million mu anticipated planting base was ful-
filled, far below the necessary economic scale for production (0.5 million mu). In 
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all, although the company had designed a business model which had the poten-
tial to be profitable, in the absence of strong support from local government, the 
company could not get the necessary resources to build a profitable business.
4  Discussion and conclusion
The findings from the three case studies support our argument that in state-capi-
talist countries, outcomes of government-business partnerships depend on firms 
having unique resources and capabilities that serve particular policy objectives 
of the state. By the same token, in order to make partnership attractive to firms, 
national and local governments must have unique resources needed in order to 
successfully operate in low-income markets. The cases further illustrate that in 
order to build and maintain successful government-business partnerships over 
time, the alignment of incentives plays an important role. In sum, complemen-
tary resources and well-aligned interests between firms and governments help to 
explain why some government-enterprise partnerships are more successful than 
others.
The three case studies display different types of government-business 
partnerships that aim to service low-income markets in China’s state capitalist 
context. All three companies partnered with central and local governments 
to enter low-income markets, though the nature of these partnerships dif-
fered in terms of the partnership’s governance structure, voluntary vs. invol-
untary nature, and initiator and firms and governments’ incentives (Table 1). 
The cases reflect a variety of partnership governance structures, ranging from 
purely strategic partnerships, in which enterprises and governments maintain 
their respective independence, to bona fide joint ventures, in which enterprises 
and governments form a new legal entity with mixed ownership where either 
the government or the enterprise holds majority shares. The variation among 
these partnership models are, to some degree, a reflection of the different 
interests and available resources of the enterprises and government bodies. A 
large state-owned enterprise, like China Mobile, might well have better access 
to financial resources and a wider product distribution network as compared 
to a small, private start-up company such as Jiukang, thus making it an attrac-
tive partner to serve the central government’s policy objectives to alleviate 
poverty. The three partnerships also differ in terms of stakeholder involve-
ment, the scale of investments, impact on low-income groups, and business 
scale, all of which influence actors’ preferences for a particular governance 
model.
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4.1  Partnerships with “Chinese characteristics”
Government-business partnerships in China share many characteristics with 
multi-sectoral partnerships models in other low-income markets. As in other 
places, in China, successful government-business partnership models are only 
possible when partners bring complementary resources to the table and have 
overlapping interests and incentives. Yet, there are a number of findings that 
seem to distinguish China’s statist environment from the freer markets that are 
typically the foucs of the BoP literature:
 – Governments, firms, and NGOs have different resources and freedom to 
operate under the terms of state capitalism. In China, local governments 
often stand in for the role played by NGOs in other contexts or they create 
NGOs that are directly affiliated to governmental organizations. At the same 
time, state-owned enterprises are important players in the market with privi-
leged access to finance and other resources. The different characteristics 
of governments, firms, and NGOs in China’s state capitalist context help to 
explain why multi-sectoral partnerships take such different forms in China’s 
low-income markets.
 – Companies and governments often share common interests and incentives in 
China’s low-income markets. The Chinese leadership in Beijing views poverty 
alleviation and improvement of farmers’ livelihood as crucial to maintain-
ing their political legitimacy. The raft of new government initiatives aimed 
at alleviating rural poverty will provide improved business opportunities for 
firms to enter low-income markets by partnering with governments and offer-
ing tax incentives.
 – Yet, if companies’ business models do not meld with governments’ objec-
tives and incentives, this can lead to the withdrawal of government support 
and eventual business failure. The case of Zhilian illustrates the importance 
of well-aligned incentives in order to build and maintain a successful gov-
ernment-business partnership. Although the local government and Zhilian 
brought very complementary resources to the table, misaligned incentives 
prevented the partnership from developing its full potential. Initially, Zhilian 
lacked sufficient financial resources, fertile land, and the support from 
farmers, all constraints that the local government could have helped with. 
But since Zhilian’s business model could not deliver fast economic returns 
within a 3-year time frame, local officials lacked sufficient personal incen-
tives to support Zhilian since leading local officials need to deliver concrete 
and measurable results within a 3-year time frame in order for these achieve-
ments to count for the next promotion cycle. In the absence of sustained 
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support from the local government, Zhilian failed to obtain the necessary 
resources to grow a successful business.
 – In the context of China’s state capitalist system, these partnerships are at 
times more obligatory than voluntary for enterprises. In the case of China 
Mobile, two central ministries initiated the information platform INPRA and 
worked closely with China Mobile from the start, while maintaining inde-
pendent organizational structures. In contrast, Jiukang initiated the part-
nership with the government and entrepreneurs and government officials 
established a jointly-owned shareholder company with a single profit center. 
Zhilian also initiatited its partnership with the government, but no new gov-
ernance structure was created and the government was not included as a 
shareholder or investor.
 – Yet, our findings suggest that such partnerships in which government actors 
more or less compel enterprises to participate are not necessarily losing ven-
tures. For China Mobile, the INPRA served to rapidly expand the company’s 
customer base in rural areas which has become the most dynamic segment 
of China’s telecommunications market in recent years. In addition, China 
Mobile has amassed considerable expertise in the area of service provision in 
low-income rural markets. The company aims to leverage this knowledge in 
expanding into other developing country markets such as Pakistan.
Finally, in state capitalist economies, the state owns and operates some of the 
most valuable assets and largest domestic companies, thereby ensuring that the 
state has enough leverage within the economy to safeguard its survival. In the 
context of an economic system bounded by a powerful state, partnering with 
governments can help firms to lower the risks connected with institutional voids 
by providing access to finance and helping to gain the trust of farmers in low-
income markets. Firms that partner with governments can take steps to create 
or strengthen each node in the value network so as to manage the external risk 
factors, such as weak infrastructure impairing transports of products. Firms that 
align their business model with government objectives and interests may well 
reap great benefits from such partnerships in the long run.
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